{"id":3837,"date":"2026-09-13T11:38:45","date_gmt":"2026-09-13T08:38:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/kaf1.org\/?page_id=3837"},"modified":"2026-09-13T11:38:45","modified_gmt":"2026-09-13T08:38:45","slug":"china-should-not-fuel-an-arms-race-says-a-close-watcher-of-its-nuclear-policy","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/?page_id=3837","title":{"rendered":"China should not fuel an arms race, says a close watcher of its nuclear policy"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Its interests would be better served if it led on crafting nuclear rules, argues Tong Zhao<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sep 3rd 2025 Economist<\/p>\n\n\n\n

THE HIGH-PROFILE display of nuclear might that China staged at its latest military parade on September 3rd showcased a full spectrum of land-, sea- and air-based systems. The country\u2019s growing willingness to exhibit its nuclear strength signals its waning faith in diplomacy to bridge divides with America and other Western rivals over clashes of strategic interests and ideological values. Instead, it is betting that raw power will secure domestic legitimacy, protect sovereignty and enforce its vision of regional peace and international order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chinese strategists argue that time will bend the world to a more powerful, confident China\u2014and stability will follow. Yet the rapid growth of its arsenal from around 200 warheads several years ago to some 600 today, potentially reaching 1,000 by 2030, isn\u2019t coercing deference. Worse, it is spawning instability China didn\u2019t foresee. Rather than bemoan an increasingly lawless world and lean harder into self-help, China could pivot\u2014to champion a rules-based nuclear order<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

America, rattled by the unprecedented challenge of simultaneously confronting two nuclear near-peers\u2014Russia and China\u2014appears likely to boost its nuclear capabilities. American concerns about China\u2019s build-up, more than Russia\u2019s nuclear threats, are driving doubts over the last remaining US-Russia arms-control treaty and hastening the collapse of the global arms-control regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s silence about the ultimate size and purposes of its nuclear forces feeds fears of a doctrinal shift from pure deterrence towards a willingness to consider the first use of nuclear weapons. American strategists feel compelled to map detailed nuclear-war scenarios between the two countries\u2014ranging from limited regional exchanges to all-out homeland strikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This, in turn, is likely to push China towards more advanced nuclear-warfighting preparations. Even if deterrence never fails and luck never runs out, the process ensures an unwinnable arms race. Haunted by the Soviet collapse, China has vowed repeatedly to avoid such races. The challenge lies in recognising\u2014and stepping back from\u2014the slippery slope.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regionally, China\u2019s nuclear build-up provides political cover for North Korea\u2019s own nuclear expansion, fuelling pressure in Japan and especially South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons. On China\u2019s western flank, any Indian response to China\u2019s nuclear expansion will increase the nuclear threat facing China and probably trigger Pakistani countermeasures\u2014a nuclear chain reaction with global ripple effects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Paradoxically, China has escalated verbal attacks on America\u2019s policy of extended nuclear deterrence\u2014the nuclear umbrella that reassures allies and, crucially, discourages them from building their own bombs. While China sees it as a projection of American military influence, this arrangement has also long served China\u2019s interests by keeping America\u2019s allies non-nuclear. Undermining it now is self-defeating, especially when the worsening security environment is already tempting American allies to reconsider their nuclear abstinence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s nuclear diplomacy today resembles that of a permanent opposition party: better at criticising the system than shaping it. Given China\u2019s declared aspiration of an orderly system grounded in shared rules, it could instead show real leadership by proposing concrete solutions to specific security challenges and opening them to international scrutiny and debate. Its slogan of \u201ca community with a shared future for mankind\u201d will ring hollow unless backed by shared, actionable security rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Take China\u2019s advocacy of \u201cindivisible security\u201d\u2014the idea that no country should gain security at others\u2019 expense. It is meaningless unless applied to real-world problems such as the escalating arms race across the Asia-Pacific to build \u201ctheatre-range\u201d missiles (those designed to hit targets in a specific region).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On its overall nuclear capabilities, China dodges talks with America, wary of cold-war optics and its smaller arsenal. But these concerns need not stop China from engaging with Britain and France. All three possess only a few hundred nuclear weapons and profess \u201cminimum deterrent\u201d strategies\u2014that is, maintaining just enough of an arsenal to deter nuclear-armed adversaries. Such a trilateral dialogue could clarify what minimum deterrence means in practice, give China a more politically acceptable forum to explain how its growing arsenal aligns with its professed minimalist strategy, and explore how smaller nuclear powers can support, rather than obstruct, US-Russia arms control. Even without direct talks with America, the Chinese could be more open about their nuclear thinking in such settings, providing much-needed reassurance to the international community.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To believe that raw power will silence rivals and secure long-term peace is not strategy but illusion. Having risen to unprecedented international strength, China must decide whether to be feared for fuelling humanity\u2019s most destructive arms race or respected for helping build shared rules that ensure China\u2019s own past humiliations cannot be repeated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Number of words — 784<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Number of characters — 4530<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Its interests would be better served if it led on crafting nuclear rules, argues Tong Zhao Sep 3rd 2025 Economist THE HIGH-PROFILE display of nuclear might that China staged at its latest military parade on September 3rd showcased a full spectrum of land-, sea- and air-based systems. The country\u2019s growing willingness to exhibit its nuclear strength […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_regular_price":[],"currency_symbol":[],"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3837","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"post_slider_layout_featured_media_urls":{"thumbnail":"","post_slider_layout_landscape_large":"","post_slider_layout_portrait_large":"","post_slider_layout_square_large":"","post_slider_layout_landscape":"","post_slider_layout_portrait":"","post_slider_layout_square":"","full":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/3837","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3837"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/3837\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3838,"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/3837\/revisions\/3838"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3837"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}