{"id":4252,"date":"2026-11-13T22:13:57","date_gmt":"2026-11-13T19:13:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/?page_id=4252"},"modified":"2026-11-13T22:13:57","modified_gmt":"2026-11-13T19:13:57","slug":"bogged-down-in-ukraine-russia-is-meddling-elsewhere","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/?page_id=4252","title":{"rendered":"Bogged down in Ukraine, Russia is meddling elsewhere"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Its \u201cgrey-zone\u201d provocations in northern Europe will intensify in the coming year<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Nov 10th 2025| By Arkady Ostrovsky, Russia editor, The Economist<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A spectre is<\/small> haunting Europe: the spectre of direct conflict with Russia. Cyber-attacks and incidents of sabotage are increasing. Russian drones are flying over Poland, Germany and Denmark, causing shutdowns of civilian airports. \u201cIn Europe, there is at best an icy peace, which at any time can erupt into hot confrontation,\u201d Martin J\u00e4ger, the head of Germany\u2019s intelligence service, said recently. Baltic countries are practising mass evacuations in case Russia invades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet in Ukraine, Russia\u2019s \u201cmighty army\u201d has been unable to take over the whole of the Donbas region\u2014the one concrete objective articulated by Vladimir Putin when he began his full-scale invasion. After making initial progress, it has taken less than 1% of Ukraine\u2019s territory since the end of 2022. Russian cemeteries are expanding to accommodate some 250,000 graves of soldiers killed since the start of the war. And Russia\u2019s economy is under stress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hence the \u201cgrey-zone\u201d provocations in northern Europe, which will intensify in 2026. The less Mr Putin can achieve on the battlefield in Ukraine, the more he will want to escalate elsewhere to achieve his goals. He calculates that the greater the threat Europeans perceive to themselves, the more they will prioritise their own rearmament over providing support to Ukraine, undermining its defence. Already, Ukraine is struggling to mobilise men\u2014and confidence in the president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is fraying.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mr Putin\u2019s war in Ukraine is central to his battle against the West, which he believes has treated Russia (and him personally) unfairly and treacherously. Feeling rejected by the West and unable to compete with it economically, he chose war as the only way to dismantle the American-led security system and expand his own power. He aims to undermine NATO<\/small>, destabilise European democracies, and divide and intimidate societies that have grown used to peace. Russia\u2019s \u201cgrey-zone\u201d provocations in northern Europe will intensify in 2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mr Putin\u2019s thinking aligns with Russia\u2019s military culture, which maintains that the goal of war is not the occupation of territory, but the destruction of the defence and security that sits atop that territory. Yet in nearly four years of war, Russia has been unable to destroy Ukraine\u2019s armed forces or disconnect them from the pump of money and weapons provided by the West. The two former Soviet armies have reached a stalemate on the ground, largely because drones have neutralised Russia\u2019s numerical advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How will the conflict play out in 2026? Long-range drones have allowed both sides to expand the war well beyond the front line. Ukraine has disabled around 40% of Russia\u2019s oil refineries using its own long-range drones and missiles and American intelligence. Russia has devastated Ukraine\u2019s energy infrastructure and gas production. Ukraine will soon need extra funds from Europe, which is struggling with its own public spending. Russia\u2019s grey-zone activity in Europe is designed to increase that pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet Mr Putin\u2019s resources are not infinite. Since 2022 he has mainly relied on contract soldiers, which has been costly and insufficient. To take full advantage of Ukraine\u2019s vulnerabilities he would have to order a general mobilisation and move the economy to a war footing, which carries political risks. The fall in oil revenues is already constraining his military spending. And opinion polls show that Russians are tired of his \u201cspecial military operation\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In September 2025 Dmitry Peskov, Mr Putin\u2019s spokesman, was compelled to explain that war is not \u201cpurposeless\u201d, framing it in existential terms. \u201cThe special military operation is one thing, but what is happening around us is a war,\u201d he said. \u201cWe need to win it for the sake of our children, our grandchildren, and for [Russia\u2019s] future.\u201d Mr Putin may decide his best option is to freeze the active phase of the war and turn it into a permanent struggle with occasional flare-ups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The West sees the war as a crisis that needs to be managed and ultimately resolved, to restore peace and stability. But that is exactly what Mr Putin wishes to prevent. Steve Covington, strategic and international affairs adviser to NATO<\/small>\u2019s Supreme Allied Command Europe, likens Mr Putin\u2019s actions to a revolution: its purpose is to accelerate the collapse of what Mr Putin believes is already a half-rotten system. And as Vladimir Lenin, the father of the Bolshevik revolution, explained, the worst thing that can happen to a revolution is the loss of momentum. \u25a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Its \u201cgrey-zone\u201d provocations in northern Europe will intensify in the coming year Nov 10th 2025| By Arkady Ostrovsky, Russia editor, The Economist A spectre is haunting Europe: the spectre of direct conflict with Russia. Cyber-attacks and incidents of sabotage are increasing. Russian drones are flying over Poland, Germany and Denmark, causing shutdowns of civilian airports. \u201cIn […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_regular_price":[],"currency_symbol":[],"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4252","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"post_slider_layout_featured_media_urls":{"thumbnail":"","post_slider_layout_landscape_large":"","post_slider_layout_portrait_large":"","post_slider_layout_square_large":"","post_slider_layout_landscape":"","post_slider_layout_portrait":"","post_slider_layout_square":"","full":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4252","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4252"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4252\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4254,"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4252\/revisions\/4254"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kaf1.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4252"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}